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Module 17 of 30

Weapons and controlled substances

The Second Amendment after Heller, Bruen and Rahimi, SAPC chapter 46 carry, prohibited-person, NFA, discharge and knife offenses, SAHSC chapter 481 penalty groups and distribution, constructive and joint possession, field identification limits, dog sniffs and safe handling.

Required for Class A Class B Class C Class F

The exam draws 30 questions from a bank of 58. You have 45 minutes, and you need 80% to pass. Questions apply the law to situations. To prepare, read this guide alongside the cited sections of the San Andreas codes, the 2026 Law Enforcement Reform Package and the federal authorities below. The U.S. Constitution binds every San Andreas officer. Supreme Court decisions are binding; federal circuit decisions are accepted authority, and where circuits differ the academy teaches the rule that protects rights more.

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms (U.S. Const. amend. II). District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) held that the right protects possessing a handgun in the home for self-defense, and McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) applied it to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, so it binds San Andreas and every officer in it. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022) extended protection to carrying a handgun in public for self-defense and held that a restriction must fit the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. United States v. Rahimi (2024) confirmed the limits: a person whom a court has found to pose a credible threat to an intimate partner's safety may be temporarily disarmed. Two lessons follow for patrol. Lawful ownership and carry are protected conduct, so a gun alone is not evidence of a crime. And the offenses in SAPC chapter 46 remain enforceable law. Whether a statute survives a constitutional challenge is for the courts, not for an officer at the roadside; an officer who stops enforcing a statute because he doubts it, or who treats every armed citizen as a suspect, has misunderstood the job.

Buying a firearm in San Andreas is a background check, not a permit. Only a felony conviction refuses a gun sale, and there is no licence to purchase. The License to Carry (LTC) is a carry permit only. Carrying a concealed handgun on or about the person in public without a valid LTC issued by the State or another recognized jurisdiction is a Class A Misdemeanor (SAPC §46.17), and carrying a handgun in another manner not authorized by law is §46.01. Section 46.17 reaches only concealed carry in public, so it does not apply to a firearm kept at home. Transporting an unloaded firearm in a vehicle in a way technically inconsistent with transport rules, with nothing else aggravating, is only the Class C offense of §46.83. Arrest authority follows the charge: the code assigns mandatory custodial arrest to the chapter 46 and chapter 481 felonies, most Class A and B misdemeanors such as §46.17, §481.01, §481.02 and §481.15 are discretionary arrests, and Class C offenses such as §46.70 and §46.83 are citation and release. A misdemeanor record, an expired LTC or no LTC at all does not stop a sale; a felony does.

Because public carry is protected and LTC holders carry lawfully, the academy teaches the more protective rule: seeing a holstered or concealed handgun, without more, is not reasonable suspicion of a crime. A bare anonymous tip that a person has a gun, with no predictive detail or corroboration, does not justify a stop and frisk; there is no firearm exception (Florida v. J.L.). Presence in a high-crime area adds little on its own (Illinois v. Wardlow). An officer may always talk to an armed person consensually. Once a stop is lawful for another reason, the officer may ask whether the person is armed and may ask to see an LTC. A frisk of the person still requires reasonable suspicion that he is armed and dangerous (Terry v. Ohio; Arizona v. Johnson), and a protective search of a car's passenger compartment requires reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon (Michigan v. Long). A driver who calmly discloses a lawfully carried pistol and follows instructions has given the officer information, not a reason to search.

An LTC never overrides a place restriction. Carrying a firearm onto premises where carrying is prohibited by law, including courts, schools, polling places and establishments licensed to serve alcohol, is SAPC §46.02; openly carrying a long gun into such places, racetracks or secured airport areas is §46.18. Anyone who is not an on-duty peace officer and carries a firearm, a knife with a blade over 5.5 inches or another prohibited weapon into a law-enforcement facility with a holding area, jail, booking room or detention space commits a 3rd Degree Felony (§46.27). Carrying a firearm while intoxicated, without the normal use of mental or physical faculties, is §46.13, and the section makes no exception for LTC holders. Criminal negligence that lets a child younger than 17 reach a readily dischargeable firearm is §46.14, a Class A Misdemeanor that becomes a State Jail Felony if the child fires it and causes death or serious bodily injury, and §22.60 is charged alongside it when the child fires and injures someone. Intentionally or knowingly transferring a firearm to a person under 18 without a parent's or guardian's consent is §46.08, and the minor's own possession outside a parent's presence without consent is SAFC §51.05.

The sale check refuses felons and no one else, but several possession offenses reach other people, and officers enforce them in the field. A felon who possesses a firearm before the fifth anniversary of release from confinement or community supervision commits a State Jail Felony (SAPC §46.03); the clock runs from release, not conviction. After that anniversary, possession outside the person's home is a 3rd Degree Felony (§46.04), so a felon past the five-year mark who keeps a gun inside his own home commits neither offense. A felon may not purchase, own or possess body armor (§46.15), a standalone felony even with no gun, while §46.86 is narrower, reaching violent felons who buy or acquire enhanced armor. Possessing a firearm while subject to an active protective order protecting a family or household member or intimate partner is §46.19 (Rahimi upheld temporarily disarming a person whom a court has found to pose a credible threat to an intimate partner's safety); possession by an unlawful drug user is §46.20, and by a person adjudicated mentally defective or involuntarily committed is §46.21. Knowingly selling a firearm to a felon is §46.42. A straw purchase, buying from a dealer for a prohibited person (§46.48), exposes both the buyer and the person who directs it. A knowingly false statement on a purchase application, such as denying a felony, is §46.16 whether or not the sale goes through.

Some firearms and parts are unlawful because of what they are. Knowingly possessing a firearm whose serial number has been removed, altered or obliterated is SAPC §46.06, and the unserialized-firearm offenses (§46.07, §46.22, §46.84) turn on a missing manufacturer's serial number, including kit-built and 3D-printed guns. Knowingly converting a semi-automatic firearm, or possessing a device designed to convert one, to fire more than one round per trigger pull is §46.23; it covers auto sears, switches and forced reset triggers, and the device alone is enough. A machine gun not registered before 19 May 1986 is §46.26. A rifle barrel under 16 inches, a shotgun barrel under 18 inches, or a firearm made from a rifle or shotgun with an overall length under 26 inches requires an NFA tax stamp and ATF registration (§46.24, §46.12), as does a suppressor (§46.25), and a person who shows both commits no offense. Possessing a stolen firearm (§46.05) requires knowing it was stolen; knowledge is an element (Morissette v. United States), and circumstances such as a back-alley price far below value can prove it. Plain view allows seizing an item whose incriminating character is immediately apparent from a lawful vantage point (Horton v. California), but moving an item to expose its serial number is a separate search that needs probable cause (Arizona v. Hicks).

Discharge offenses turn on mental state, target and result. Recklessly firing inside municipal limits or where people are likely to be endangered is SAPC §46.28; target shooting on remote rural land with no one nearby is not. A reckless discharge that causes bodily injury, without intent to shoot the victim, is a 3rd Degree Felony (§46.33). Recklessly pointing a firearm at a person, loaded or not, is Deadly Conduct (§46.40). Knowingly firing at or toward a habitation, building or vehicle while reckless about endangering someone inside is a 2nd Degree Felony (§46.39), 1st Degree when fired from a vehicle in a public place; nothing need be hit and no one need be inside. Firing into a dwelling knowing people are inside is §46.32, and intentionally firing from a vehicle with no one struck is §46.29. Intentionally displaying a firearm in a manner calculated to alarm another person, without specific intent to use it, is Brandishing (§46.34); a public display that reasonably alarms bystanders is §46.35. Using or exhibiting a firearm during a felony involving force or violence against a person is §46.30. Possessing a firearm available for use in a drug trafficking offense is §46.46, and the section makes no exception for LTC holders.

San Andreas permits carrying most knives in most public places; the code punishes the place, the blade and the manner of display. A blade longer than 5.5 inches in a school, polling place, court, racetrack, secured airport area, on-premises alcohol business, hospital or correctional facility is SAPC §46.81, and a long blade, dagger, sword or machete on school premises is the State Jail Felony of §46.76. Displaying an edged weapon in public in a manner calculated to alarm people nearby, without directing it at anyone in particular, is §46.79. Intentionally threatening a specific person with imminent bodily injury using a blade, creating reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury, is §46.80, the weapons code's specific charge for a knife pulled in a fight short of a cut; the code describes it as a weapons-specific codification of Aggravated Assault by Threat (§22.05), and it is more specific than the general threat-only assault of §22.01. Knowingly possessing brass or metal knuckles is §46.72 wherever it happens, while §46.82 reaches nunchaku, clubs and similar weapons in prohibited places or where possession threatens public safety. Explosives are serious felonies: possessing explosive materials without a permit (§46.49), an improvised explosive device (§46.51), or materials held with intent to build a bomb (§46.50). Patrol never handles a suspected device; isolate it, evacuate, and call the bomb squad.

SAHSC chapter 481 grades possession by substance and amount, and most of its possession offenses expressly require that the person intentionally or knowingly possessed the substance. A controlled substance includes any adulterant or dilutant (SAPC §1.56), so the weight of a cut mixture counts, but packaging does not. Penalty Group 1 is graded by weight: under 1 gram, State Jail Felony (§481.04); 1 to under 4 grams, 3rd Degree (§481.05); 4 to under 400 grams, 2nd Degree (§481.06); 400 grams or more, 1st Degree (§481.07). Penalty Group 2, which the code says includes MDMA, psilocybin, PCP and mescaline, is a Class A Misdemeanor under 1 gram, a State Jail Felony from 1 to 4 grams, a 2nd Degree Felony from 4 to 400 grams and 1st Degree above (§481.14). Penalty Group 3 covers benzodiazepines, barbiturates and similar drugs without a valid prescription: Class A under 28 grams, 3rd Degree from 28 to 200 grams, 2nd Degree above (§481.15). Penalty Group 4, limited-codeine compounds such as some cough syrups, is Class B under 28 grams and Class A above (§481.16). The common mistake is to assume every amount under a gram is a State Jail Felony; that tier belongs to Penalty Group 1.

Several substances have their own scales. Marijuana is Class B under 2 ounces (§481.01), Class A from 2 to under 4 ounces (§481.02), a State Jail Felony from 4 ounces to under 5 pounds (§481.11) and 3rd Degree from 5 to 50 pounds (§481.12). Concentrates such as wax, shatter and hash oil are graded as Penalty Group 2 because of their potency, a State Jail Felony under 1 gram (§481.18). Fentanyl is a State Jail Felony under 1 gram, with ranges of 2 to 20 years from 1 to 4 grams and 5 to 99 years from 4 to 200 grams (§481.20). LSD is charged by dose unit rather than weight (§481.21). A controlled prescription medication held without a valid prescription is §481.09, but a person carrying her own prescribed medicine commits no offense. Possession within 1,000 feet of a school, college, public swimming pool, video arcade, school vehicle or playground carries the Drug-Free Zone enhancement (§481.26), and paraphernalia is an offense only when possessed with intent to use it to introduce a drug into the body (§481.03).

Intent to deliver is proved by circumstances, because few dealers announce their plans: quantity inconsistent with personal use, individual packaging, scales, ledgers, cash in small bills, and messages arranging sales (SAHSC §481.28 to §481.32). One bag and nothing else is a possession case graded by weight. Manufacturing is complete in any amount (§481.43). Knowingly maintaining a premises, vehicle or facility where drugs are made is Operating a Drug Lab (§481.44), and a place used to store, distribute or use them is a drug house (§481.50). Possessing precursors or lab equipment with intent to manufacture is §481.24; excess pseudoephedrine alone, without that intent, is the narrower §481.25. Manufacturing with a child under 18 present is a 1st Degree Felony (§481.49). Delivering any controlled substance to a person under 18 is a 1st Degree Felony regardless of substance or amount, with no close-in-age exception (§481.37), as is an adult using a minor in trafficking (§481.41). Delivery that causes the recipient's death is §481.39. Delivering a fake drug represented as real is §481.51, and lacing a supply with fentanyl without disclosure is §481.53. An agreement to distribute plus an overt act completes Conspiracy to Distribute (§481.35) for every party before any drugs change hands.

Possession may be actual or constructive, meaning knowing control over a place or container, and several people may possess the same item jointly. Two standards apply. To arrest, officers need probable cause, a fair probability judged on the whole picture (Illinois v. Gates; District of Columbia v. Wesby). In Maryland v. Pringle, drugs found where every occupant of a small car had access gave probable cause to arrest each occupant when none claimed them. To convict, the State must prove knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship), so the report must document each person's links to the drugs: access and proximity, control of the place or container, personal papers mixed with the drugs, fingerprints, admissions, furtive movements, flight, paraphernalia and cash. Mere presence, or simply living in a shared home, is weak on its own. Pringle's small-car reasoning does not reach a crowd: a premises warrant does not allow frisking everyone present without individualized suspicion (Ybarra v. Illinois), although a contraband warrant allows limited detention of occupants during the search (Michigan v. Summers). With probable cause to search a car, officers may search passengers' belongings that could hold the object of the search (Wyoming v. Houghton; California v. Acevedo).

Field identification is presumptive. A colour-change test, an officer's recognition, a pill imprint or a suspect's own words can support probable cause in the totality (Illinois v. Gates), but none establishes identity or weight. Counterfeit pills may hold fentanyl or nothing controlled (SAHSC §481.51, §481.53), so markings never confirm contents. Report what you did: describe the item, give the field weight as gross weight with packaging, call the test presumptive, and submit it to the lab. A lab certificate is testimonial, so the analyst must be available for cross-examination (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts). Suppressing evidence favourable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment violates due process (Brady v. Maryland); losing potentially useful evidence violates due process only in bad faith (Arizona v. Youngblood), but careless handling still destroys prints and DNA. Treat every firearm as loaded and control the muzzle. Where safe, photograph and note its location and condition before moving it, handle it minimally, record the serial, and never wipe it or put anything in the barrel. Treat unknown powder as possible fentanyl: wear gloves, avoid making it airborne, package it for the lab, and keep naloxone ready. Hiding or destroying naloxone to prevent its use in an overdose is §481.57, and failing to summon help one safely could summon is §481.52 unless Good Samaritan protection applies.

A trained dog's sniff in a public place is not a search, because it reveals only contraband (United States v. Place), and a sniff during a lawful traffic stop that does not prolong it is not a search (Illinois v. Caballes). The time limit is strict: once the stop's tasks are or reasonably should be complete, police may not extend it, even briefly, for a dog without independent reasonable suspicion (Rodriguez v. United States), and a later alert cannot justify the delay. Detaining luggage on reasonable suspicion for a sniff must also be brief; in Place, 90 minutes was too long. Bringing a dog onto a home's front porch to sniff is a search of the curtilage (Florida v. Jardines). A checkpoint whose primary purpose is finding drugs is unconstitutional (City of Indianapolis v. Edmond), though a properly run sobriety checkpoint is reasonable (Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz). Under Act V, certification attaches to the handler and dog together in a named discipline (Act V §5.04), so a patrol-only team may not run narcotics sniffs, and a team whose certification lapsed does not deploy in that discipline until restored (§5.06).

Constitution and case law

The federal authorities this module's questions rely on, and the rule the academy takes from each.

U.S. Const. amend. II
Individual right to keep and bear arms, subject to regulations consistent with the nation's historical tradition.
U.S. Const. amend. IV
No unreasonable searches and seizures; warrants only on probable cause, supported by oath, particularly describing the place and things.
U.S. Const. amend. VI
Speedy and public trial, notice of charges, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process and counsel.
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013)
Bringing a drug dog onto a home's front porch to sniff is a search of the curtilage.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Officers may briefly detain on reasonable suspicion of crime and frisk outer clothing for weapons if they reasonably believe the person is armed and dangerous.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)
A warrant to search premises does not allow frisking everyone present without individualized suspicion.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)
A bare anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without predictive information or corroboration, does not justify a stop and frisk.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)
Unprovoked headlong flight on seeing police in a high-crime area can support reasonable suspicion; presence in the area alone cannot.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
A brief detention of luggage for a dog sniff is permitted on reasonable suspicion, but a 90-minute detention was too long.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)
Police may not prolong a completed traffic stop, even briefly, for a dog sniff without independent reasonable suspicion.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
A dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop that does not prolong it is not a search.
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009)
An officer may frisk a passenger during a lawful traffic stop on reasonable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
The passenger compartment may be frisked for weapons on reasonable suspicion the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon.
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)
Properly conducted sobriety checkpoints are reasonable.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
A checkpoint whose primary purpose is general crime control, such as finding drugs, is unconstitutional.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)
Under the automobile exception police may search containers in a vehicle where they have probable cause the evidence may be found.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)
With probable cause to search a car, officers may search passengers' belongings capable of holding the object of the search.
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)
Plain-view seizure requires a lawful vantage point, lawful access and an immediately apparent incriminating character; discovery need not be inadvertent.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
Moving an item to see a serial number is a search requiring probable cause.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
Probable cause is a fair probability judged on the totality of the circumstances, including a tip's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge.
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
A search warrant for contraband carries limited authority to detain occupants while the search is conducted.
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003)
Drugs found where all occupants had access can give probable cause to arrest each occupant.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)
Failing to preserve potentially useful evidence violates due process only when police act in bad faith.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)
Forensic lab certificates are testimonial; the analyst must be available for cross-examination.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
The Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
The Second Amendment protects carrying a handgun in public for self-defense; restrictions must fit the nation's historical tradition.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
A person found by a court to pose a credible threat to an intimate partner's safety may be temporarily disarmed.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)
Criminal intent is presumed to be an element of serious crimes unless the legislature clearly dispenses with it.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of a crime.

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