Impaired driving and collision investigation
SATC chapter 49V intoxication offenses, reasonable suspicion and probable cause for DWI, field sobriety evidence, implied consent and blood testing, Miranda and home-entry limits, chapter 550 crash duties, scene management and collision evidence.
Required for Class A Class B Class F
The exam draws 30 questions from a bank of 57. You have 45 minutes, and you need 80% to pass. Questions apply the law to situations. To prepare, read this guide alongside the cited sections of the San Andreas codes, the 2026 Law Enforcement Reform Package and the federal authorities below. The U.S. Constitution binds every San Andreas officer. Supreme Court decisions are binding; federal circuit decisions are accepted authority, and where circuits differ the academy teaches the rule that protects rights more.
Chapter 49V of the Transportation Code defines intoxication two ways, and either is enough: not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol or a controlled substance, or having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (SATC §49V.01). Operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated is DWI - First Offense, a Class B Misdemeanor (§49V.01). With one prior DWI conviction it is §49V.02, a Class A Misdemeanor with a mandatory minimum of 30 days in jail or 80 hours of community service; with two or more priors it is §49V.03, a 3rd Degree Felony with mandatory custodial arrest and a two-year revocation. The grade depends on convictions, so confirm priors in court and NCIC records before choosing the charge. A passenger younger than 15 makes it §49V.04, a State Jail Felony with mandatory custodial arrest, and the code requires notification of Child Protective Services. DWI in a designated construction or maintenance zone where workers are present is §49V.12 (Class A). A DWI driver who had an open container of alcohol in the immediate vicinity of the operator's seat also commits §49V.08; anyone who knowingly possesses an open container in a vehicle in a public place, driver or passenger, commits SAPC §42.25 (Class C).
Some drivers face lower thresholds or special offenses. A person younger than 21 commits §49V.07 by driving in a public place with any detectable alcohol. For a driver 21 or older with a concentration between 0.01 and the legal limit who shows signs of impaired driving insufficient for DWI, §49V.27 provides a Minor Impairment Citation, an infraction with citation and release; it does not apply to drivers under 21. Operating a commercial motor vehicle at 0.04 or more is DWI - Commercial Vehicle (§49V.09, Class A, discretionary arrest), and a CDL holder operating a commercial motor vehicle at or above the commercial threshold commits §522.05 (Class A, mandatory custodial arrest); both require a commercial vehicle, not the driver's personal car. Driving in a public place while impaired by a controlled substance, prescription medication or any other substance that deprives the driver of normal use of faculties is §49V.10, a State Jail Felony with mandatory arrest; impairment by marijuana specifically, shown by failed tests, THC at impairing levels or observed impairment, is §49V.13 (Class B). A person ordered to use an ignition interlock who tampers with or bypasses it, uses another person's breath, or drives a vehicle not equipped with the device commits §49V.15, a State Jail Felony.
When an intoxicated driver hurts someone, the injury decides the charge. Causing serious bodily injury by reason of intoxication is Intoxication Assault (§49V.05, 2nd Degree Felony). Serious bodily injury means injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member or organ (SAPC §1.41); a bruise or a minor cut is bodily injury (§1.40) but not serious bodily injury, so it does not make the crash Intoxication Assault. Causing a death by reason of intoxication is Intoxication Manslaughter (§49V.06, 2nd Degree Felony, two-year minimum). A sober driver who recklessly causes a death commits Vehicular Homicide - Reckless (SAPC §19.13), and that section itself directs that a death caused while intoxicated is charged as Intoxication Manslaughter. A death caused by criminal negligence is SAPC §19.03. Reckless Driving is §49V.16, and reckless driving that causes bodily injury is §49V.17. Every one of these offenses carries mandatory or discretionary arrest as the code states, and the felony intoxication offenses are mandatory.
A DWI stop needs reasonable suspicion like any other stop. Driving cues such as drifting across lane lines, straddling the center line, wide turns, braking for no reason and large speed changes supply it, as does any traffic violation (Whren). Random stops to look for drunk drivers are forbidden (Delaware v. Prouse), but neutral sobriety checkpoints are allowed (Sitz). A 911 caller who reports that a specific vehicle just ran her off the road, giving its description, location and plate, can supply reasonable suspicion of drunk driving even if the officer sees no further bad driving after finding the vehicle: the caller claims eyewitness knowledge, reports soon after the event, and uses a system that can identify and trace callers (Navarette v. California). A bare anonymous assertion with no basis of knowledge and no description of dangerous driving is different, and is too thin on its own (Florida v. J.L.). Once stopped, look for odor, speech, eyes, coordination, admissions, containers and how the driver handles documents. Ask every driver at a crash scene about drinking and look for impairment; the at-fault driver is not the only one who may be impaired.
Miranda follows custody, not the type of offense. Ordinary roadside questioning during a traffic stop is not custodial interrogation, so warnings are not needed (Berkemer v. McCarty). Once the driver is arrested, or his freedom is curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest, Miranda applies even to a misdemeanor traffic offense, and questions or their functional equivalent (Rhode Island v. Innis) require warnings and a waiver first. The privilege against self-incrimination protects testimonial evidence only: a blood sample is physical evidence, so taking it does not violate the Fifth Amendment (Schmerber v. California). Standardized field sobriety tests (horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk-and-turn, one-leg stand) come from general professional practice, not statute. They reveal clues of impairment; they do not measure an alcohol concentration. Give the instructions as trained, on a reasonably flat, dry, lit surface, and ask about injuries, medical conditions, footwear and eyesight, because a bad knee or a slope weakens what the test shows. The SATC creates no offense for declining field sobriety tests; the refusal offense in §49V.11 concerns breath or blood after a DWI arrest. Probable cause to arrest rests on the totality of the evidence (Illinois v. Gates): driving, appearance, admissions, tests and any breath result together. The odor of one beer and an admission to one drink, with normal driving and clean tests, is not probable cause of intoxication.
San Andreas uses implied consent. A person who has been arrested for DWI and asked to submit to a breath or blood test under implied consent, and refuses, commits DWI - Refusal to Submit (§49V.11), a separate Class B Misdemeanor; the licence is suspended automatically for 180 days on a first refusal and two years on a repeat refusal, whatever happens to the DWI charge. The duty arises only after arrest: declining a test before any DWI arrest is not §49V.11. Watercraft have a parallel refusal offense (§31W.08). The Constitution shapes how the law is used. A breath test is a permissible search incident to a lawful drunk-driving arrest and needs no warrant, so a breath refusal can be punished; a blood test is far more intrusive, cannot be required as a search incident to arrest, and a motorist cannot be criminally punished for refusing a warrantless blood test (Birchfield v. North Dakota). The academy therefore teaches: ask for breath, rest any §49V.11 charge on a breath refusal, and get a warrant for blood. Consent to a blood draw must be voluntary in the totality of the circumstances (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte); consent given after an officer asserts authority that he does not have, such as a false claim of a warrant or a threat that refusing blood is itself a crime, is not voluntary (Bumper v. North Carolina; Birchfield).
A warrantless blood draw needs a real exigency. In Schmerber, the time spent taking an injured driver to hospital and investigating the crash, while alcohol dissipated, justified a draw without a warrant. But the natural dissipation of alcohol does not create an exigency in every case; where officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a sample is drawn without significantly undermining the search, they must (Missouri v. McNeely). When a driver is unconscious and must be taken to hospital before a breath test can be given, the exigent-circumstances rule will almost always permit a warrantless blood test (Mitchell v. Wisconsin, plurality opinion). Any draw must be performed in a medically reasonable manner by qualified medical personnel (Schmerber). Document the timeline: time of driving, time of arrest, the steps taken to seek a warrant, and when the sample was drawn and by whom.
A DWI suspect's home is protected like any other. Officers who want to arrest a DWI suspect inside his home need a warrant, consent or a genuine exigency (Payton v. New York). In Welsh v. Wisconsin, a warrantless night-time entry to arrest a driver for a minor, nonjailable drunk-driving offense was unreasonable; the gravity of the offense weighs heavily, and the wish to preserve blood-alcohol evidence was not enough. The flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not categorically justify following him into his home or garage; officers need a case-specific emergency (Lange v. California). In Hopkins v. Bonvicino, officers investigating a minor collision entered the home of a suspected drunk driver without a warrant, and the court held that neither the dissipation of alcohol nor an unsupported claim of emergency justified the entry. The emergency-aid exception still applies: if officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe the driver is seriously injured inside, they may enter to help (Brigham City v. Stuart). Apply the rule that protects rights more: do not enter a home to collect alcohol evidence without a warrant or consent.
After a DWI arrest, search the arrestee's person and secure the vehicle. A vehicle search incident to arrest is allowed if it is reasonable to believe evidence of the offense of arrest might be in the car (Arizona v. Gant); an open bottle in the cupholder, a smell of spilled beer or a receipt from a bar can make further containers in the passenger compartment reasonably likely. If no licensed driver is available after a DWI arrest, impound is mandatory (SAAC §10.01). Collision duties come next. A driver who knowingly fails to stop, render aid and exchange information after a property-damage crash commits Hit and Run - Property Damage Only (SATC §550.01, Class B); with an attended vehicle it is §550.02 (Class A). Failing to stop and render reasonable assistance after a crash causing bodily injury is §550.03 (3rd Degree Felony, mandatory arrest); with serious bodily injury it is §550.04 (2nd Degree Felony); with death §550.05 (1st Degree Felony). Leaving after striking a pedestrian is §550.08 and after striking a bicyclist §550.09, both 3rd Degree Felonies with mandatory arrest.
The other crash duties are just as specific. A driver who stays at the scene of an injury crash but fails to render reasonable assistance, such as calling for emergency medical services, giving first aid if trained and capable, and giving the injured person identifying information, commits §550.06 (Class B); the duty to render aid is separate from the duty to stop, and a driver who stops, calls 911 and waits for responders has met it. A driver who stops after a damage crash but does not give the other party the operator's name and address, the owner's name and address, the registration number and evidence of insurance commits §550.07, including by refusing documents, giving false information or leaving before the exchange is complete. When the crash causes injury, death or $1,000 or more in property damage and no officer investigated at the scene, the driver must report it to the nearest law enforcement agency as soon as possible (§550.10). After a minor crash or breakdown, a vehicle that can be moved safely must be moved from the traffic lanes (§550.11); one with blown tires or steam from the engine is exempt. A driver who damages an unattended vehicle or fixed object must find the owner or, only if the owner cannot be found, leave a conspicuous written note with name, address and registration number (§550.12, Class C, raised to Class B when the damage exceeds $2,500).
Manage the collision scene in order: protect, assess, request, preserve. Park upstream with emergency lights on so the patrol car shields the scene, and use cones or flares to move traffic. Approaching drivers must move over or slow for stationary emergency, tow and maintenance vehicles (SATC §545.49). Check every occupant, call EMS and fire early, and render aid as soon as it is safe; that is general professional practice, not a timed rule. Look for fuel leaks, downed lines and hazardous-materials placards. With a placarded load or an unknown spill, approach from upwind and uphill, stay back, read the placard from a distance, isolate the area and let fire and hazardous-materials units lead; refusing a lawful fire department order at such a scene is SAPC §28.32. A person not part of the response who enters or obstructs a crash scene after being told to stay clear commits SATC §546.03 (Class A). Identify and separate drivers, find witnesses before they leave, and look for impairment in every driver.
Collision evidence disappears fast. Before vehicles are moved in a serious crash, photograph the scene from overall, midrange and close-up positions; mark and measure the final rest positions, the point of impact, tire marks, gouges and the debris field from fixed reference points; and record road, lighting, weather and traffic control. A diagram is only as good as its measurements: a sketch with no reference points cannot support testimony about where vehicles were, and one not drawn to scale should say so. Hit-and-run cases are solved with paint transfer, broken parts and lamp fragments, damage height, witness and camera accounts, and records checks. Ownership is not proof of driving: the registered-owner inference can justify a stop (Kansas v. Glover), but a charge needs evidence of who was driving at the time of the crash. A phone seized at a crash scene may be secured, but searching its messages for evidence of texting requires a warrant (Riley v. California). Formal collision reconstruction is a specialized capability; under Act V §5.09, COLE sets standards for it only where the law authorizes them, proportionate to risk.
Constitution and case law
The federal authorities this module's questions rely on, and the rule the academy takes from each.
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