Prisoner handling, transport and detainee rights
Searching and restraining arrestees, positional asphyxia, medical care and deliberate indifference, transport, booking, deadlines and release, juveniles, suicide risk, escape under SAPC ch. 38C, and the custody duty to protect.
Required for Class A Class B Class C Class D Class E Class F
The exam draws 30 questions from a bank of 57. You have 45 minutes, and you need 80% to pass. Questions apply the law to situations. To prepare, read this guide alongside the cited sections of the San Andreas codes, the 2026 Law Enforcement Reform Package and the federal authorities below. The U.S. Constitution binds every San Andreas officer. Supreme Court decisions are binding; federal circuit decisions are accepted authority, and where circuits differ the academy teaches the rule that protects rights more.
The moment you take a person into custody, your legal position changes. Due process generally imposes no duty on the state to protect a person from private violence, unless the state has him in custody (DeShaney v. Winnebago County). Once he is handcuffed in your car or locked in your holding cell, he cannot protect himself, summon a doctor or walk away from danger, and you are responsible for his safety. For convicted prisoners, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is cruel and unusual punishment (Estelle v. Gamble), and a custodial official is deliberately indifferent when he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate's safety (Farmer v. Brennan). Arrestees and pretrial detainees have not been convicted of anything: they may not be punished at all, and restrictions on them must reasonably relate to legitimate institutional goals (Bell v. Wolfish); force against them is excessive if it is objectively unreasonable, whatever the officer's state of mind (Kingsley v. Hendrickson). The academy standard is simple: treat every person in your custody as someone whose safety and health are now your job, and never rely on 'I didn't know' when the signs were in front of you.
Search every arrestee yourself before he goes into your car, even if another officer says he has already searched him. A full search of the person is allowed incident to any lawful custodial arrest, without separate justification (United States v. Robinson): pockets, waistband, shoes and anything he carries. Search with the person restrained, from behind, systematically from top to bottom, and remove anything that could be a weapon, a tool to defeat restraints, or evidence. Search a person of the opposite sex professionally, with the back of the hand over sensitive areas, and use an officer of the same sex where practicable unless there is an immediate danger. A field search is not a strip search. Jails may visually strip-search arrestees entering the general population, even for minor offenses (Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders), but Florence concerns jail intake under the facility's procedures; it is not authority for strip searches on the street or in the back of a patrol car. Taking a DNA swab at booking for a serious offense, supported by probable cause, is a reasonable search (Maryland v. King); that holding speaks to serious offenses, not to every citation.
Restraints exist to keep everyone safe during custody, and how you apply them is part of the reasonableness of the seizure (Graham v. Connor). Handcuff behind the back by default, check the fit with a finger's width of space, and double-lock so the cuffs cannot tighten further; recheck when the person complains of pain or numbness. Cuffing in front, or using two linked sets, is appropriate for injury, pregnancy or a medical condition, with closer supervision. Zip ties are single-use and are cut off, never slipped. Leg irons are for people who kick or try to run, and you must help a restrained person walk, sit and get in and out of the car, because he cannot break a fall. Never hog-tie: tying the ankles to the wrists of a person whose diminished capacity is apparent is excessive force (Cruz v. City of Laramie). Restraints are not punishment. Removing or tightening them to cause pain, or leaving them on far longer than needed for a pretrial detainee, is the kind of punitive restriction Bell forbids.
Positional asphyxia kills restrained people who seem to be calming down. Holding a restrained person prone with pressure on the back must be judged with attention to known risks of positional asphyxia and how long the pressure lasted (Lombardo v. City of St. Louis). Kneeling on the back and neck of a handcuffed, prone, compliant man was excessive (Drummond v. City of Anaheim); so was putting weight on the back of a prone, restrained, unresisting person (Champion v. Outlook Nashville), and holding pressure on the upper back after the need ended could be (Weigel v. Broad). Risk rises with intoxication, exertion, obesity, mental crisis and long struggles. As soon as the person is cuffed, take weight off, roll him onto his side or sit him up, and watch his breathing, speech and colour. 'I can't breathe' is never proof that he can because he is talking. Transport a prisoner sitting upright and belted, never face-down across the back seat or on the floor, and if he slumps, goes quiet or stops responding, stop the car, check him and call for medical help.
Medical needs come before booking. A person who hit his head, lost consciousness, was struck by an impact round, shocked, bitten, or exposed to pepper spray, who is vomiting, confused, diabetic, pregnant, injured or very intoxicated, needs a medical evaluation, and the jail may properly refuse to accept him without one. Do not assume confusion is only alcohol; head injuries and diabetic emergencies look the same. Leaving pepper spray on a compliant, restrained arrestee and refusing decontamination can be excessive (LaLonde v. County of Riverside). The deliberate-indifference cases set the constitutional floor: an official who knows of an excessive risk and disregards it violates the Constitution (Farmer v. Brennan; Estelle v. Gamble). The academy expects more than the floor. A person in your custody cannot get care for himself, so when he tells you about a serious medical problem, or you can see one, you get him evaluated, tell the receiving staff, and write down what you saw, what he said and what you did. Never take away needed medication without passing it to medical staff.
Transport is custody on the move. Check the back seat before every transport and again after, so that anything found can be tied to the right person; if you skip the first check, you may never be able to prove that a baggie found later belonged to your prisoner. Belt the prisoner in, keep the rear doors secured, keep him in sight and never leave him alone in the car. Keep adults and juveniles, men and women, co-defendants, rivals and victims and suspects apart. Tell dispatch when you start and finish a transport. Authorized prisoner transport or custody is one of the lawful bases for acting outside primary jurisdiction (Act VII §7.03), and Class E officers hold the authority to transport people in lawful custody (Act VIII §8.06). Using force against an officer to prevent being transported is Resisting Arrest (SAPC §38.04). A prisoner who spits or otherwise causes bodily fluid to contact an officer with intent to harass, alarm or expose him commits a State Jail Felony (§22.20). An officer who engages in sexual contact with a person he knows is in custody commits §21.15, a 3rd Degree Felony; the custodial relationship makes any claimed consent ineffective.
Escape is graded by the charge and the means. Escaping from custody while held on a misdemeanor charge or conviction, including from a police vehicle, holding cell or supervised release, is a Class A Misdemeanor (SAPC §38C.01); on a felony charge or conviction it is a 3rd Degree Felony (§38C.02). Using force or the threat of force against a peace officer or detention officer while escaping or trying to escape is a 2nd Degree Felony (§38C.03), and using or exhibiting a deadly weapon makes it a 1st Degree Felony (§38C.04). A person who has legal custody of a prisoner and negligently permits or intentionally aids his escape commits §38C.05, a 3rd Degree Felony: an unlocked door, an unsearched prisoner or an unattended car can make the officer the defendant. Anyone who, knowing a person is in lawful custody, intentionally helps him escape commits Aiding Escape (§7.09); helping him after he is already free, with shelter, food or transport, is Harboring a Fugitive (§7.06). Force to prevent escape is limited by SAPC §9.09 and Tennessee v. Garner: deadly force only where the person poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury. Correctional staff follow Act VIII §8.07 and notify an agency with jurisdiction when outside help is needed.
Custody carries deadlines. A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause (Gerstein v. Pugh); a determination within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest is generally prompt, and beyond that the state must show an emergency (County of Riverside v. McLaughlin). In San Andreas the probable-cause statement reaches the court through JusticeLink, so file it promptly and completely. A peace officer who knowingly detains a person beyond the legally authorized period without charge commits Unlawful Arrest (SAPC §38.80). No one may release, transfer or take custody of a detained person except through lawful procedures (Act VIII §8.12): verify the identity of the person you release and the authenticity of any order before acting on it. If probable cause falls apart, release the person through proper channels and document why. Bring weapons into a holding or booking area only as an on-duty peace officer under facility rules; for anyone else, carrying a firearm or prohibited weapon into a law-enforcement facility with a holding area is a 3rd Degree Felony (§46.27).
Juveniles in custody need extra care. A child or minor is anyone younger than 18 (SAPC §1.37). A child's age, when known or objectively apparent, is part of the Miranda custody analysis (J.D.B. v. North Carolina), and juveniles in delinquency proceedings are entitled to notice, counsel, confrontation and the privilege against self-incrimination (In re Gault). A juvenile's request to see his probation officer is not an invocation of the right to counsel, and a juvenile's waiver is judged on the totality of the circumstances (Fare v. Michael C.). Contact a parent or guardian as soon as you can (academy practice). Keep juveniles out of sight and sound of adult prisoners in cars and holding areas. In San Andreas a minor's case goes to the county juvenile court, and the booking desk refuses to book minors, so never bring a juvenile to adult booking; the case proceeds in juvenile court.
Suicide risk is highest in the first hours of custody, especially for people who are intoxicated, ashamed, facing serious charges, arrested for the first time, or who have tried before. Take every statement of suicidal intent seriously, even one made as a joke or in anger. Remove belts, laces, cords and anything else that could be used as a ligature, keep the person under direct observation, pass the information to the receiving officer or jail staff in person and in writing, and arrange a mental-health evaluation. An emergency mental-health detention is protective custody, not punishment. The constitutional test is Farmer v. Brennan: an officer who knows of an excessive risk to a person's safety and disregards it is deliberately indifferent. Hearing a prisoner say he will kill himself tonight and doing nothing is the clearest example. Record what was said, when, to whom you passed it, and what precautions you took.
The custody duty to protect includes protection from other people. Because the state holds the prisoner, it must protect him (DeShaney), and an official who knows of an excessive risk to an inmate's safety, such as a credible threat from a cellmate or rival gang, and disregards it is deliberately indifferent (Farmer). Keep known enemies, co-defendants, informants and vulnerable prisoners apart, and pass on what you know about threats. Outside custody the rule is different: due process generally imposes no duty to protect a person from private violence (DeShaney), and a protective order holder has no constitutional property interest in police enforcement of the order (Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales). That is a limit on constitutional liability, not on your job. State law and agency policy still require you to respond, to arrest where the code requires it, and to enforce protective orders.
Detainees keep rights inside the walls, adjusted to the setting. Pretrial detainees may not be punished, and restrictions must reasonably relate to legitimate institutional goals (Bell v. Wolfish). Prison rules affecting constitutional rights are valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests (Turner v. Safley). A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a cell (Hudson v. Palmer), so cell searches need no warrant, though they must not be used to harass. Prison discipline that takes good-time credit requires written notice, a chance to present evidence when safe and a written statement of reasons (Wolff v. McDonnell). Force against convicted prisoners in a disturbance is judged by whether it was a good-faith effort to restore order or malicious and sadistic (Whitley v. Albers); force against a pretrial detainee is judged objectively (Kingsley). Class E officers maintain custody and security, conduct authorized searches and transport people in lawful custody within their correctional duties (Act VIII §8.06). For every officer, the record is part of the custody: log checks, observations, medical complaints, property and every handover.
Constitution and case law
The federal authorities this module's questions rely on, and the rule the academy takes from each.
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