Fire and arson investigation
The Class D fire investigator commission, SAPC chapter 28 arson and related fire, explosive and hazardous-materials offenses, fire scene entry and warrants (Michigan v. Tyler, Michigan v. Clifford, Camara), origin-and-cause method, evidence and disclosure, interviews, fatal fires and joint investigations, and scene safety.
Required for Class D recruits of Fire and Emergency Services agencies only
The exam draws 30 questions from a bank of 60. You have 45 minutes, and you need 80% to pass. Questions apply the law to situations. To prepare, read this guide alongside the cited sections of the San Andreas codes, the 2026 Law Enforcement Reform Package and the federal authorities below. The U.S. Constitution binds every San Andreas officer. Supreme Court decisions are binding; federal circuit decisions are accepted authority, and where circuits differ the academy teaches the rule that protects rights more.
San Andreas Fire and Rescue (SAFR) fights fires, and some of its members may also hold commissions as fire investigators working for the fire marshal. A commissioned fire investigator is a Special Enforcement Officer holding Class D authority (Act I §1.04): only the powers needed for an expressly designated responsibility (§1.09), which for a fire investigator is the investigation of fires and arson. Depending on the commission, those powers can include investigation, lawful detention, arrest, warrant execution and evidence collection for fire and arson offenses, and the investigator may follow a fire case into any county, from a brush fire outside Paleto Bay to a suspect's apartment in La Mesa. Statewide subject-matter jurisdiction is not general criminal authority. A fire investigator runs no patrol, makes no traffic stops and enforces nothing outside the fire and arson subject matter. Nobody exercises peace officer authority without both a lawful appointment and the qualifications the law requires (§1.11), and COLE certification alone confers no power to arrest: a firefighter, inspector or certified recruit who holds no commission does the fire service's work but is not a peace officer. An officer who knowingly uses powers outside the commission has acted without authority (§1.14). Inside the commission the Constitution binds a fire investigator exactly as it binds a deputy: probable cause, warrants, Miranda and the duty to disclose all apply.
Fire scenes often reveal other crimes, such as stolen cars in a burned Grapeseed garage. The Class D rule is the same each time: keep people safe, secure what you found, document it and refer the unrelated offense promptly to the agency with jurisdiction (the city police inside city limits, otherwise the sheriff for that side of Route 68), then keep working the fire. Ignoring it is wrong, and so is taking it over. A plain-view seizure is constitutional when the officer is at a lawful vantage point and the item's incriminating character is immediately apparent (Horton v. California), but that Fourth Amendment question is separate from the authority question; a fire commission does not make the investigator the case agent for a drug possession or a car theft. Concurrency is normal (§1.13): a sheriff's office or city department may investigate a fire in its territory alongside SAFR, neither must withdraw because the other is present, and arriving first decides nothing. When another crime is bound up with the fire, the agencies work a joint investigation (Act VII §7.08) whose written arrangement names the lead agency, evidence custody, information sharing and arrest authority, and gives no participant any power it did not already hold. Class D officers join mutual aid only as their enabling statutes allow, and no agreement turns a limited-authority officer into a general-authority one (§7.09); a clause saying fire investigators 'act with full police powers' has no legal effect.
Chapter 28 of the Penal Code holds the arson offenses. Arson - No Injury (SAPC §28.16, State Jail felony) is starting a fire or causing an explosion with intent to destroy or damage any building, habitation or vehicle, with no one injured. Arson - Bodily Injury (§28.17, 2nd Degree) needs the same intent toward a building or vehicle and bodily injury to any person as a result, including a firefighter hurt fighting the fire. Arson of an Occupied Structure (§28.19, 1st Degree) is starting a fire or causing an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a building that is occupied, or that the actor knows may be occupied. Aggravated Arson - Death (§28.18, 1st Degree) is defined by its result: the person starts a fire or causes an explosion and, as a result, a person dies. Arson for Insurance Fraud (§28.24, 2nd Degree) is intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion to damage property with intent to collect or cause collection of insurance proceeds, proven by the actor's financial interest in the property and the later claim. Arson of a Motor Vehicle (§28.25, State Jail) requires a vehicle belonging to another, damaged without the owner's effective consent, so it does not fit an owner who burns his own car. Arson of a Place of Worship (§28.26), of a School or Educational Facility (§28.27) and of Government Property, including public vehicles (§28.34), are each 2nd Degree felonies.
Reckless Arson (§28.20, State Jail) is recklessly starting a fire or explosion, without intent to damage property but knowing the conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of fire, resulting in damage. Arson of Wildland or Forest (§28.21, 2nd Degree) is intentionally or recklessly starting a fire that spreads to and burns wildland, forest or range. Criminal Mischief by Fire (§28.30, Class B) covers a reckless or intentional fire or smoldering, cigarette fires included, that damages another's property worth less than $500 without the full elements of arson; ordinary Criminal Mischief (§28.02) needs intentional or knowing damage of at least $100. Burn Ban Violation (§28.22, Class A) is starting or maintaining an outdoor fire during a burn ban declared by the commissioners court, governor or fire marshal; SAHSC §352.05 overlaps it. Possession of an Incendiary Device (§28.23, State Jail) is knowingly possessing a Molotov cocktail or similar device intended for arson or property damage. Serial Arson (§28.28, 1st Degree) is intentionally starting fires that damage another's property on three or more separate occasions over any time period. Arson to Conceal Another Crime (§28.29, 2nd Degree) turns on the concealment motive. Attempted Arson (§15.10) needs specific intent and an act beyond mere preparation, such as placing but failing to ignite incendiary material, and is graded below the completed offense; Conspiracy to Commit Arson (§15.23) needs an agreement and an overt act by any party, and its tier mirrors the completed arson's.
Failing to report a fire one causes or witnesses when it is possible and safe to do so, or intentionally fleeing a fire scene one caused to avoid detection, is SAPC §28.31 (Class B); a person responsible for a structure who discovers a structure fire and fails to summon the fire department immediately commits SAHSC §352.31. Refusing a lawful order of a fire officer, fire marshal or incident commander at a fire or hazmat scene is SAPC §28.32 (Class A). Entering or remaining in a cordoned or posted fire scene without the incident commander's authorization is §28.33 (Class B); Obstruction of a Fire Scene (SAHSC §352.17, Class A) adds that the entry obstructs the investigation. Interference with a Fire Investigation (§352.16, 3rd Degree) is intentionally hindering a fire marshal or arson investigator in a lawful investigation, including physically barring access, hiding or removing evidence or threatening the investigator. Tampering with Fire Investigation Evidence (§352.18, State Jail) is intentionally removing, altering, concealing or destroying fire-scene evidence knowing a fire investigation is in progress; general Tampering with Evidence (SAPC §38.19) may also apply. A knowingly false statement to a fire marshal investigator, including about who was in the structure, is SAHSC §352.19; refusing access to a fire marshal who has shown credentials and statutory authority is §352.21; refusing to appear, produce documents or answer under oath when lawfully ordered is §352.22. Knowingly reporting a fire or emergency that does not exist is SAPC §38.61.
Fire scenes injure investigators who treat them as finished, so scene safety comes first; the academy teaches it as general practice. Do not enter until the incident commander or safety officer agrees the structure may be entered, utilities are controlled, and collapse hazards, holes in floors and unstable walls have been assessed. Smoldering debris gives off toxic gases, including carbon monoxide, long after the visible smoke has cleared, so respiratory protection and air monitoring stay in use during excavation. Investigators do not work a scene alone, and someone outside always knows who is inside and where. A suspected explosive device, or a possible secondary device after an explosion, changes everything: stop, do not touch, move or dig around the item, withdraw people to a safe distance and call for bomb disposal. Possession of Explosives Without Permit (SAPC §46.49), Possession of Bomb-Making Materials with intent to manufacture a device (§46.50) and Possession of an Improvised Explosive Device (§46.51) are 3rd Degree felonies, and Bombing of Public Places (§46.53) is 1st Degree. Hazardous materials have their own offenses: storing flammable liquids, propane or other hazardous materials in a residence beyond code-permitted residential amounts (SAHSC §505.01), storing incompatible chemicals in a way that risks fire or explosion (§505.06), and failing to report a reportable release (§505.05). Tampering with a pipeline carrying petroleum, gas or hazardous material is SAPC §28.12.
A burning building is an exigency. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), held that fire officials may enter a burning building without a warrant and stay a reasonable time afterwards to investigate the fire's cause, and that later reentries after that need a warrant or consent. Prompt investigation matters in practice because it helps prevent rekindling and preserves evidence before it is lost. While the investigator is lawfully present, arson evidence in plain view may be seized if its incriminating character is immediately apparent (Horton v. California). Evidence found on a reentry that needed a warrant or consent and had neither is excluded (U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio). Two lessons follow. First, the reasonable-time window is about an investigation that flows from the emergency, not about a clock: Tyler sets no fixed number of hours, and the investigator must be able to explain why the work was a continuation of the firefighting rather than a new entry. Second, Tyler's rule covers any burning building, not only homes, so a burned store, warehouse or workshop is protected as well, and the fire does not give the investigator a free hand to return whenever it is convenient. Document when the fire was knocked down, when you entered, any pause and why, and when the scene was released to the owner, because those times decide whether a later entry needs paper.
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984), governs searches after the exigency ends. Once it is over, an origin-and-cause search of a fire-damaged home needs an administrative warrant, and a search whose purpose is gathering evidence of a crime needs a criminal warrant on probable cause. An investigator who arrives hours after the crews have left, while the owners' contractor boards up the windows, is not continuing the firefighting; the exigency is over, and without consent she needs a warrant. Which warrant depends on the purpose. An administrative warrant is issued on reasonable legislative or administrative standards rather than probable cause of a crime (Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)), and it still comes from a magistrate. A criminal search warrant needs probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found. Purpose can change during the search. Once the cause is found, for example a fuel can wired to a timer at the origin, further searching of other rooms is for evidence of a crime and needs a criminal warrant. Evidence of a crime seen in plain view from a lawful position during a valid administrative search may be seized (Horton v. California), and what the investigator saw may supply the probable cause for a criminal warrant (Illinois v. Gates), but the administrative warrant never becomes a general evidence search. Write the purpose of every entry in the notes, because a court will ask what the search was for.
Consent is an alternative to either warrant. It must be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances; knowing the right to refuse is a factor, not a requirement (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte). Its scope is what a reasonable person would understand from the exchange, so consent to examine the kitchen where the fire started does not cover the upstairs bedrooms or a detached garage (Florida v. Jimeno). Record who consented, to what and when, and obtain it in writing where practicable. When a warrant is needed, it must come from a neutral and detached magistrate (Coolidge v. New Hampshire); a fire chief, a fire marshal or a prosecutor cannot issue one, however urgent the case and however administrative the warrant. A criminal warrant needs probable cause, a fair probability judged on the totality of the circumstances, including an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge (Illinois v. Gates). A warrant fails if the affiant knowingly or recklessly included a false statement necessary to probable cause (Franks v. Delaware). Academy practice goes further: never leave out facts that undercut probable cause, such as negative laboratory results, because an affidavit built by omission misleads the magistrate. An affidavit that states an opinion as a fact, such as 'pour patterns prove gasoline was used' when the laboratory found none, invites a Franks challenge. Describe what you observed and what the laboratory found, accurately and completely. A knowingly false sworn affidavit is also a crime (SAPC §37.17).
Origin-and-cause work follows the scientific method, and the academy teaches it as general professional practice consistent with nationally recognized fire investigation guidance. Recognize the need, define the problem, collect data, analyze it, develop hypotheses from the data, and test each hypothesis against all of the data, including the facts that do not fit, before selecting a final one. The origin is where the fire started; the cause is the fuel, the ignition source and the circumstances that brought them together. Every potential ignition source in the area of origin, such as appliances, wiring, outlets, heaters, smoking materials and candles, must be identified and considered, and reasonable accidental and natural causes must be examined and ruled out before a fire is classified as incendiary. Ruling them out is necessary but not sufficient: an incendiary conclusion must also rest on evidence that supports it, such as an ignition device or a laboratory-confirmed ignitable liquid where none belongs, not on the mere absence of an accidental explanation. Cause is classified as accidental, natural, incendiary or undetermined, and when the evidence cannot distinguish between the hypotheses that survive, the honest classification is undetermined. Guard against expectation and confirmation bias. A detective's theory, an owner's debts or a neighbor's rumor is information to record and test, not a conclusion to confirm, and an investigator who decides early and then looks only for support produces findings that will not survive cross-examination.
The scene examination moves from the areas of least damage to the areas of most damage, usually exterior first and then interior, so the investigator reads how the fire spread before reaching the place it burned longest. The origin area is excavated carefully, layer by layer, because the order of the debris records the sequence of the fire. Document before you change anything. Photograph the scene as found, from overall views to mid-range to close-ups, with and without a scale, and photograph each item in place before it is moved. Sketches record dimensions, evidence locations and fire patterns; notes record what was seen and done, by whom and when. Body-worn camera and CAD entries supplement those records but do not replace them. In the practice the academy teaches, fire patterns are data to be interpreted with caution, not proof. Ventilation, fuel load, suppression and full-room involvement (flashover) can produce irregular floor burns and low burns that look like pour patterns although no ignitable liquid was present. Crazed glass can result from rapid cooling when water strikes hot glass, and spalled concrete can result from heat and moisture; neither proves an accelerant. Patterns help locate the origin and trace the spread, but a claim that an ignitable liquid was present needs laboratory analysis of properly collected samples. A canine alert the laboratory does not confirm is recorded, but it is not a reliable basis for concluding that an ignitable liquid was present.
Fire debris samples go into clean, unused, airtight containers sealed and labeled, because ignitable-liquid residues evaporate and paper or cardboard lets them escape. Investigators change gloves between samples and use clean tools so one sample cannot contaminate another, and where practical take a comparison sample of the same material from an area not believed to be involved. Every item carries a chain of custody: who collected it, when and where, its condition and seal, and every transfer after that, so the court can see the exhibit was never unaccounted for. A seal does not replace the record. Appliances, wiring and devices that may have caused the fire are preserved, and destructive examination is planned so that interested parties, such as the owner, insurers or a manufacturer, have notice and an opportunity to attend; that practice prevents spoliation claims and protects the case. Failing to preserve potentially useful evidence violates due process only when police act in bad faith, and negligence is not bad faith (Arizona v. Youngblood), but practice is to preserve everything and record any loss. Suppressing evidence favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment violates due process (Brady v. Maryland), including impeachment evidence such as promises to a witness (Giglio v. United States). The prosecution is responsible for what anyone acting on its behalf knows (Kyles v. Whitley), so a negative laboratory result goes to the prosecutor as surely as a positive one.
Interview the 911 caller, first-arriving firefighters, neighbors and occupants early. Suspect interviews follow the same rules as any police interview. Miranda v. Arizona requires warnings and a valid waiver before custodial interrogation, and a person placed in custody must be warned whatever the offense (Berkemer v. McCarty). Custody is objective, judged by how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand the situation, and an officer's undisclosed suspicions do not decide it (Stansbury v. California). A person who comes to the SAFR office voluntarily, is told he is not under arrest and leaves afterwards is not in custody (Oregon v. Mathiason); a person handcuffed in the back of a patrol car at the investigator's request is. Once a suspect in custody asks for counsel, questioning stops until counsel is present unless the suspect initiates (Edwards v. Arizona). A deliberate question-first, warn-later technique makes the warned repeat confession inadmissible (Missouri v. Seibert), unlike a good-faith mistake followed by a voluntary warned statement (Oregon v. Elstad). After charges are filed, agents may not deliberately elicit statements about the charged offense without counsel, directly or through an informant (Massiah v. United States). SAHSC §352.22 punishes refusing to answer under oath when the fire marshal's statutory authority requires it. It cannot override the Fifth Amendment: a person may not be punished for declining to give an answer that would incriminate him (U.S. Const. amend. V; art. VI, cl. 2).
Every fatal fire is investigated as a potential homicide until the evidence shows otherwise. Once life-saving efforts are over, the fire investigator keeps the body in place and the scene secured, and at once notifies the agency with general jurisdiction (the city police inside city limits, otherwise the county sheriff) and the death investigators. The body stays where it is until it has been photographed and documented; if firefighters moved the victim, the report says so and records the original position. The case then runs as a joint investigation under a written arrangement naming the lead agency, evidence custody, information sharing and arrest authority (Act VII §7.08). In academy practice the fire investigator carries the origin and cause and the homicide investigators carry the death. The arrangement gives no participant new powers, so each arrest is made by an officer whose own authority covers it, whatever anyone's rank. Aggravated Arson - Death (SAPC §28.18) needs a fire or explosion that results in a death. Felony Murder (§19.11) needs an act clearly dangerous to human life in the course of a felony such as arson; the intent to commit the felony supplies the mental state, and no intent to kill is required. Capital Murder in the course of arson (§19.06) requires an intentional murder. A victim killed before the fire, with the fire set to destroy the body, points to Arson to Conceal Another Crime (§28.29) together with the homicide itself.
Constitution and case law
The federal authorities this module's questions rely on, and the rule the academy takes from each.
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