Family violence, protective orders and juveniles
Family-violence offenses and scene practice, protective orders and disarmament, child abuse and custody offenses, consent and emergency entry in shared homes, and how minors are questioned, searched and routed to juvenile court (SAPC ch. 22 and 25, SAFC ch. 51, 85 and 261, and the controlling federal cases).
Required for Class A Class B Class F
The exam draws 30 questions from a bank of 58. You have 45 minutes, and you need 80% to pass. Questions apply the law to situations. To prepare, read this guide alongside the cited sections of the San Andreas codes, the 2026 Law Enforcement Reform Package and the federal authorities below. The U.S. Constitution binds every San Andreas officer. Supreme Court decisions are binding; federal circuit decisions are accepted authority, and where circuits differ the academy teaches the rule that protects rights more.
Family violence starts with a definition. A "family or household member" (SAPC §1.34) is a spouse or former spouse, a parent, a child, anyone related by blood or marriage, a person with whom the actor has or had a dating relationship, and anyone who resides or formerly resided in the same household as the actor. Former partners and former roommates count; a coworker or neighbour who never shared the home and never dated the actor does not. Assault Causing Bodily Injury (§22.02) covers anyone, and when the victim is a family or household member the offense is recorded as family violence for enhancement. Domestic Violence, Bodily Injury (§22.08) is the specific offense: intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to a family or household member or a dating partner. It is a Class A Misdemeanor, and the relationship is an element the State must prove, so the report must say exactly how the parties are related and for how long. Bodily injury includes physical pain, however slight; visible marks are not required. A §22.08 assault committed after a prior conviction for a family-violence offense, or for strangulation under §22.04, is Repeat Domestic Violence (§22.09), a 3rd Degree Felony. The prior must be a conviction; an earlier arrest or a dismissed case does not raise the grade.
Two family-violence offenses carry the code's arrest-authority entry "Mandatory custodial arrest (family violence)". Assault by Strangulation or Suffocation (§22.04) is intentionally, knowingly or recklessly impeding another person's normal breathing or blood circulation by pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth, where the victim is a family or household member or the conduct otherwise meets the elements of assault under §22.02; loss of consciousness is not required, and impairment however brief completes the offense. It is a 3rd Degree Felony. Continuous Family Violence (§22.24) is two or more family-violence assaults under §22.08 within a period of 12 months or less, against one or more family or household members; neither act needs to have been prosecuted, and jurors need not agree on which acts occurred, only that two or more did. It is also a 3rd Degree Felony. When probable cause for either exists, the suspect is arrested whatever the victim prefers. A first §22.08 offense, by contrast, carries discretionary custodial arrest. Stalking (§22.26) requires conduct on more than one occasion, directed at a specific person, that the actor knows or should know will cause fear of bodily injury or death, or fear for the safety of the person's family, household or property, and that would cause a reasonable person such fear; it is a Class A Misdemeanor. Stalking in violation of a protective order, while possessing a deadly weapon, after a prior stalking conviction, or causing serious bodily injury or serious mental impairment is Aggravated Stalking (§22.27), a 3rd Degree Felony with mandatory custodial arrest.
Family-violence calls are dangerous because emotion, weapons and a home the suspect knows all meet at the door. Approach with a partner, listen before knocking, and separate the parties out of sight and hearing of each other. Interview the victim, the suspect and any children or neighbours separately and record what each says in their own words. As a matter of professional practice (the code itself does not define the term), identify the predominant aggressor from the injuries, who used force first, defensive versus offensive wounds, size and strength, statements, history and who is afraid of whom; do not simply arrest everyone who is marked. Document strangulation carefully because outward signs are often faint: marks on the neck, red eyes or pinpoint spots, a hoarse or lost voice, trouble swallowing or breathing, and the victim's description of how it felt. Photograph injuries, the scene and damaged property, and keep the body-camera running. Preventing someone from calling 911, for example by grabbing or smashing a phone, is Interference with Emergency Communications (§38.25), a separate Class A Misdemeanor. Write the report so a prosecutor can prove every element without the victim, because victims often recant or stop cooperating for reasons that have nothing to do with whether the assault happened.
Evidence-based prosecution depends on the Confrontation Clause (U.S. Const. amend. VI). Under Crawford v. Washington, testimonial statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are admissible only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior chance to cross-examine. Davis v. Washington draws the working line: statements made to resolve an ongoing emergency, such as most 911 calls made during or immediately after an attack, are not testimonial, while statements describing past events for later prosecution, such as a written statement taken at the station once the danger has passed, are testimonial. Michigan v. Bryant applies the same emergency analysis to on-scene questioning while an armed assailant is still at large. Practically, preserve the 911 recording and CAD timeline, capture the victim's first words on body camera, note the victim's demeanour and the time, and gather independent evidence such as photographs, medical records, witness accounts and the suspect's own admissions. A recantation does not erase the earlier evidence; it is one more fact to document, and an officer never pressures or bargains with a victim to change a statement either way.
Entry into the home is governed by the Fourth Amendment. Payton v. New York requires a warrant to enter a home to arrest absent exigency or consent. The emergency-aid exception lets officers enter without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with injury (Brigham City v. Stuart). Michigan v. Fisher adds that officers need not wait for proof of serious injury or confirm the danger before acting; signs such as screaming, crashing, blood or a report of a weapon can be enough. The entry and any search are limited to the emergency: find the people, stop the violence, render aid and secure weapons that threaten safety. Caniglia v. Strom holds that there is no community-caretaking exception for homes, so a general welfare concern without facts showing an emergency does not justify going inside without consent or a warrant. If the facts at the door are calm and nothing suggests anyone needs immediate help, knock, talk and ask; if the facts change, the emergency rule applies from that moment.
Consent in a shared home turns on who is present and who objects. Consent must be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte). Under Illinois v. Rodriguez, a search is valid when officers reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe the consenting person has authority over the premises, so a woman who says she lives there, has a key and has her belongings inside can give apparent-authority consent; if she tells officers she moved out weeks ago and only kept a key, that belief is no longer reasonable. Georgia v. Randolph holds that a physically present co-occupant's express refusal overrides another occupant's consent to search the shared home. Fernandez v. California limits Randolph: an objector who has been lawfully removed, for example by a lawful arrest for assaulting the consenting occupant, no longer defeats a remaining occupant's consent, even if he objected before he was taken away. None of these consent rules restricts the emergency-aid exception; officers who reasonably believe someone inside is being hurt may enter regardless of who objects at the door.
Protective orders are enforced through SAFC §85.01. A person commits Violation of a Protective Order if, having been served with or having actual notice of a protective order issued by a court, the person knowingly commits an act the order prohibits, including communicating with the protected person, going near them, or possessing a firearm in violation of the order. It is a Class A Misdemeanor with discretionary custodial arrest. Violating the order by committing an assault under §22.02 against the protected person, or after two prior convictions for violating a protective order, is a 3rd Degree Felony (§85.02). Actual notice is enough: if an officer at the scene reads or explains the order to a respondent who was never formally served, the respondent has notice from that moment. The San Andreas code in the academy's data does not set out how orders are issued or served, so officers verify an order's existence, terms and status through records, the court in JusticeLink or the order itself, and report exactly which term was broken and how the respondent knew of it. The order binds the respondent. A protected person's invitation does not change its terms; only the court can modify or dissolve it.
Firearms and family violence meet in SAPC §46.19: possessing a firearm while subject to an active protective order issued to protect a family or household member or intimate partner is a State Jail Felony. "Active" matters; once an order has expired or been dissolved, §46.19 no longer applies, though other prohibitions may. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep a handgun at home for self-defence (District of Columbia v. Heller) and to carry in public (New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen), and regulations must fit the nation's historical tradition. United States v. Rahimi holds that a person whom a court has found to pose a credible threat to an intimate partner's safety may be temporarily disarmed consistent with that tradition. San Andreas community practice is separate: the purchase background check refuses a sale only for a felony conviction, and a licence to carry is a carry permit, not a purchase licence. Passing the counter check never makes possession lawful for someone a protective order forbids to possess. At a scene, firearms are taken only by lawful means: in plain view during a lawful entry, with valid consent, incident to arrest, or under a warrant.
Two Supreme Court cases mark the edge of constitutional liability, not the edge of professional duty. DeShaney v. Winnebago County holds that due process generally imposes no duty on the State to protect a person from private violence unless the State has the person in custody. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales holds that the holder of a protective order has no constitutional property interest in police enforcement of it, so a failure to enforce does not by itself violate due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Recruits sometimes read these cases as permission to treat protective orders lightly. That is wrong. They say only that a federal damages suit on those theories usually fails; they do not excuse neglect of duty, agency policy, discipline or the officer's oath, and the mandatory family-violence arrest entries still apply. Respond promptly, enforce the order when probable cause exists, document every contact, and never promise a victim protection you cannot deliver; instead explain safety planning, how to reach help, and what the order does and does not do.
Chapter 25 and SAFC chapter 85 also cover custody and support. Interference With Child Custody appears twice. SAPC §25.03 is taking, retaining or concealing a child in violation of a court order establishing another person's custody or visitation rights, or knowing the taking violates the express terms of a custody order. SAFC §85.03 is taking, retaining or enticing a child younger than 18 from the lawful custody of a parent, guardian or custodian, knowing it violates a court order or the custodian's lawful rights. Both are State Jail Felonies. Concealing the child, removing the child from the State, or using force, threat or fraud raises it to Aggravated Interference (SAFC §85.04), a 3rd Degree Felony, and removing a child from the State knowing it violates a custody order, with intent to deprive the custodian of access, is SAFC §85.09. Where no court order exists and both parents hold equal rights, neither parent is taking the children from the other's exclusive lawful custody, so a dispute over where the children stay is ordinarily civil: keep the peace, check for orders and welfare concerns, and refer the parents to the court. Criminal Non-Support (§25.04; SAFC §85.08) requires a legal duty of support, an intentional or knowing failure, and the ability to pay. Harboring a Runaway Child (§25.05) is knowingly sheltering a runaway without the parents' consent and without notifying police within a reasonable time. A parent who knowingly permits habitual truancy commits §25.06.
Child abuse offenses use their own age line. A "child" or "minor" generally means a person younger than 18 (§1.37), but the core child-abuse offenses protect children younger than 15: Child Abuse, Bodily Injury (§22.42), a 3rd Degree Felony; Child Abuse, Serious Bodily Injury, intentional or knowing (§22.43), a 1st Degree Felony; Abandonment or Endangering a Child (§22.41); and Child Neglect (§22.47), an omission of necessary care by a person with a legal duty, placing the child at substantial risk. The parental discipline justification (§9.08) covers only non-deadly force, and force causing bodily injury beyond transient discomfort exceeds it. A parent who knows a child needs care for a serious illness or injury and fails to seek it, so that the condition worsens, commits §22.58; a parent who knows or should know a child is being sexually abused and fails to take reasonable steps commits §22.56. Officers are mandatory reporters: anyone listed in §22.50, expressly including law enforcement officers, who has cause to believe a child's health or welfare has been harmed by abuse or neglect must report it immediately to a law enforcement agency or Child Protective Services. Obstructing a CPS investigation (SAFC §261.01), knowingly filing a false abuse report to harass or gain advantage (§261.02), interfering with a removal order (§261.03) and hiding a child in defiance of one (§261.05) are separate offenses.
Some conduct is unlawful only because the actor is a minor. Running away (SAFC §51.01) is a civil status matter resolved through custody and welfare review, not a criminal conviction. Truancy (§51.02), a minor possessing tobacco or vaping products (§51.03) and a minor possessing or drinking alcohol (§51.04) are status offenses; alcohol is excepted when the minor is in the immediate presence of, and has the consent of, a parent or legal guardian. A minor possessing a firearm outside a parent's presence and without the required consent commits §51.05, a Class A Misdemeanor, and an adult who transfers a firearm to someone under 18 without parental consent commits SAPC §46.08. An adult whose criminal negligence lets a child younger than 17 reach a readily dischargeable firearm commits §46.14. The juvenile curfew (§58.01) applies to persons younger than 17 in a public place from 11 PM to 6 AM on weekdays and midnight to 6 AM on weekends, with exceptions for a parent or responsible adult, travel to or from work, and emergencies. In Oceanview, every matter against a person under 18 goes to juvenile court in JusticeLink, and the booking desk refuses to book a minor. Arresting officers file the case so it reaches juvenile court; the minor is never processed through adult booking.
Juveniles keep their constitutional rights and need more care, not less. In re Gault holds that juveniles in delinquency proceedings are entitled to notice of the charges, counsel, confrontation and the privilege against self-incrimination (U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; amend. V). Miranda v. Arizona applies to custodial interrogation of a minor, and J.D.B. v. North Carolina makes the child's age, when known to the officer or objectively apparent, part of the custody analysis: a 13-year-old pulled from class into a closed office with an officer may be in custody where an adult would not. Fare v. Michael C. holds that a juvenile's request to see a probation officer is not an invocation of the right to counsel and that waiver is judged on the totality of the circumstances, including age, experience, education and intelligence; a clear request for a lawyer still ends questioning under Edwards v. Arizona. The San Andreas code in the academy's data does not require a parent to be present before a minor is questioned, but best practice is to contact a parent or guardian early, use plain-language warnings, confirm understanding in the child's own words, keep sessions short and record the whole interview.
Schools are a special setting. New Jersey v. T.L.O. allows school officials to search a student on reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of law or school rules, with a scope reasonably related to that purpose and not excessively intrusive given the student's age and sex and the nature of the infraction. Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding holds that a strip search of a student for common painkillers, without any indication of danger or that the pills were hidden in her underwear, was unreasonable. T.L.O. is a rule for educators enforcing school discipline. The Supreme Court has not decided what standard applies when police lead or direct a school search, and lower courts differ, so the academy teaches the rule that protects rights more: when an officer initiates or directs the search, or a school official searches at police request to build a criminal case, treat it as a police search that needs probable cause and a warrant or a recognised exception (U.S. Const. amend. IV). A school resource officer still responds to immediate threats such as a reported gun with ordinary police authority, and any questioning of a student in a closed office is analysed under J.D.B.
Constitution and case law
The federal authorities this module's questions rely on, and the rule the academy takes from each.
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